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CAPITAL GAINS EXCEPTION
TO THE HOUSE'S GENERAL
UTILITIES REPEAL: FURTHER
INDIGESTIONS FROM OVERLY
PROCESSED CORN PRODUCTS
by John W. Lee

John w.. Lee is an Associate Pr'ofessor of LEIW at ·
Marshall-Wythe School of Law; College of William
and Mary.. Before a,ssurriing fiis profes,sorial post,
Lee practiced tax law iii Richmond, Virginia , and
published widely on many tax subjects in scholariy .
journals, practical guides, and learned treatises.
Mr. Lee expresses his gratitude to the American
Institute on Federal Taxation for'the opportunity to '
. present a paper and.lecture. on '7axable Corporate., .
Acquisitions: A Transactional Analysis of Section
338," given in Birmingham, Alabama on June 19,
1985, for which much of the basic research utilized
in this article was undertaken. He also thanks Mark
Bader, his student, researchassfstaiit, .and friend
fo r his invafuable research ' ror tha"t paper ' on thJ
Corn Products doctrine and section 337.
In this article, Lee fi rst describes the mechanics
and ta x effects of cost basis corporate acquisitions
' and analyzes why ' current tax (ules (avor 'such
acquisitions over carryover,basis acquisition (e .g., .
tax-free mergers); then he describes the House 's
proposed repefll in HR 3838 of the General Utilities '
doctrine in current sections 336-338, focusing on
the continued exemption for long-term cC!piJa! gains
of a closely held active business corporation .. This
Sf!ts the stage for analysis gf the Corn Products
doctrine, which under
"integral asset" reading
would deny the exemption to most appreciated
operating assets, surely not the intent ,of the
drafters,. The article describes the conflicting isolated sales reading, the prior case law developr:nent
of both readings as to depreciable operating assets
(section 1231) and segtion 337, and, asks.for con~
gressional clari fication", The footnotes . explore a
number of policy issues, e.g., repeal of Gener.al
Utilities, and additional doctrinal conflicts.

I. Introduction
:Urider present law a purchasingco; poration u.s~ally
effects a cost-basis acquisition of all or a substantial part
of another corporation 's assets.either by (a) a directasset
purchase from Target corporation 1 * in connection with its "
timely liquidation (to which existing section 337 applies
at the corporate level and section 331 at the share.holder
level), or (b) a timely purchase of "contmi " (at least 80
percent) of Target's stock followed b,y a timelyelediq(J ,bf
existing section 338.. In the direct asset acquisition (l)the
purchasing corporation obtains a section 1012 cost basis
for Target's assets2and leilvesb,ehind Target's, ~'tax 1i'ttrib~
utes"3; (2) Targetrecognizes income iri a " buIKs'ale" of its
assets orilyto the .extent of " recapture inc ome,;' which "
overrides the shield of existing section . 337;4 and (3) ,
Target's shareholders recognize capital gain .on the
liquidating distributions by TargetS If the purchasing
corporation purchased the assets on credit , Target's
shareholders may reporttheir (capital) gain on the installment method ,6 thus treating principal payments on the
purchasing corporation 's " purchaser evidences of indebtedness" distrib.uted to them in thesec~ i on 331 liquidation
of Target as payments (when received) for their Target
stock.7
•
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Commentators and experts ·, disagree as to
whether .the cost-basis rules [aI/owed by sections 337 and 338 of thfl Code1 mere/ylue/, or .
merger",:
are the motor that drives,. the) iur.ref1t,
.
..
.
mania.
'.

,.

~ .

'.'

With the Target stock acquisition route, (1) Target is
treated pursuant to the purchasing corpo ration 's electiQn '
of existing section 3388 as . a new corporatio'n: with
" clean slate" of tax attributes, w.h ich purchased (old)
Targ et's assets on the day after purch'a sing corporati<;>n
acquired such controL9 New Target corporation obtains a
cost basis in such assets equal, in uncomplicated single
shot 100 percent acquisition , to the sum Of purchasing
corporat ion 's purchase price of such stock (including '
any future p~ymerits) , and old Target's liabilities (in Cluding the ta x on old Target's recapture income);'0 (2) old

a
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Target is deemed to have sold on the day purchasing
corporation acquired control. all of its assets for "fair
market value in a single transaction to which section 337
applies,"" thereby triggering ,as to old Targe~only tax
on its recapture income; and ' (3) Target's shareholders
recognize capital gains on the ~ale of their stock to
~haSing corporation ,' 2lfpurchasing corporati6n 'spurse price includes future payments, Target's shareholders may report their gain on the installment method .
Purchasing corporation may maintain, new Target corporation's continued~ existence (presumably filing consolidated -i ncome tax returns)' 3 or may liquidate it in a
nonrecognition transaction receiving the assets at new
Target corporation's section 338(b) "cost" basis,,'4
In contrast under present law (1) purchasing corporation may obtain a " carryover" basis (i..e., old Target's
basiS) in Target's assets by (a) acquiring its assets or
stock in a " reorganization " qualifying under section 368,
in which case (2) Target does not recognize any gain'S
and purchasing corporation(or Target as an 80 percent
controlled subsidiary) maintains, subject totne section "
382 rules governing " carryover" of old Target'sNOLs, its
tax attributes; ,md.(3) shareholders of old Target do not
rec'ognize any gain or loss to fheextent they receive
stock in purchasing corporation in the transaction and , 'o f
course , will have a "substituted " basis!'n such stock.'6 '
Alternatively, purchasing corporation may transactionally
elect" carryover basis by acquiring 'control of Target but
not electing section 338 and then maintainihg or liq'uidating it, although in this event Target's shareholders will '
recognize gain ' or loss as to the consideration they
receive, including any stock in purchasing corporation .'B

a

H.R. 3838 continues a three decade incremental
trend toward corporate level tax parity among
[section 366, section 337, and section 338
transactions].'

A number of present tax law factors favor a cost-basis
acquisition of Target ,or its assets over a carrYOver b,asis
acquisition.' 9 Most significant is .the cumulative eff.ect ) o
cost-basis acquisitioris of (1) purchasing corporation
obtaining the benefits of leverage 20 plus ACRS on current
fair market value of Target's depreciable assets,2' (2) with
the only Target level "toll charge" , b.eing i,ts,, t<;lX on
"recapture income," which may be offset by " its net
operating losses,22 and (3) the Target shareholders'"receivinginstallment reported capital gains, 't hereby 'unlocking many dispositions '23
"
, .
.
Commentators and experts qisagree as to whether the
above cost-basis tax rules merely fuel , 'or are the motor
that drives, the current " merger-mania "24 But clearly if
the Target level toll-charge for purchasing corpeiration's
cost basis were raised from the current tax on rec~ptu,re
income only to full recognition cif ClPpreciation as the
House bill would in non-close corporations and with the
House's proposed liberalization of sectior{ 382 regarding
survival of Target's NOLs following its acquisition ,25 in a
reversal of current practice most acquisitions of Target
corporations would be structured as carryover basis
acquisitions with a resulting substantial increase in reve1376 '

nue ,26 Whether acquisitions themselves would decrease
only time can tell ,
II. Proposed Limitations on General Utilities
The House's Tax Reform Act of 1985 (H.R 3838)
continues ,a three decade incremental trend towards
corporate level tax parity among (1) corporate distributions of assets to shareholders in complete liquidation
(section 336), (2) corporate (or post-distribution shareholder) sales of Target's assets pursuant to a complete
liquidation (section 337), and (3) shareholder sales of the
Target's ' stoc,k electively treated as a sale of Target's
assets pursuant to a pseudo-liquidation (section 338) .
These reforms would also partially restore corporate,
level parity between (a) liquidating distributions, stock
sales, or asset sales on the one hand and (b) distributions
by a continuing corporation , i.e., redemptions and dividends (section 311) onthe other,, 27 At the same time, H ,R.
3838's partial repeal of the Target level shelterin existing
sections 336-338 should also be viewed as but another
step in a 20-year trend of legislatively cutting back the
scope of t,he General Utilities doctrine.28

General Utilities commonly is said to have held
that a corporation is not taxed on its nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property ... .

General Utilities commonly is said to have held that a
corporation is not taxed on its nonliquidating distributions
of appreciated property,29 but general usage extends the
term to present sections 336-338's shielding of a liquidating or deemed liquidating Target from gain or loss
recognition as to property it distributed in, or sold pu'rsuant to, a liquidation or is deemed to have sold pursuant
to an elective pseudo-liquidation, except for " recapture
income " in all three instances,, 3o The House proposals
reverse present law: generally under revised section 336338 transactions Target would be taxed as if it had sOld
such property at fair market value.3' Some nonrecognition
exceptions in such "liquidating" transactions would continue , however, largely as to long-term capital assets in
the hands of closely held active business corporations,
but only to the extent of their substantial long-term
noncorporate ownership. Thus , if Target is an active
business corporation meeting the tests of section 311 (eh
a proportion of Target's gain or loss on the sale or
distribution of long-term capital assets will be ignored in
transactions falling under proposed sections 336-338,
The proportion ignored 'is equal to the percentage of
Target's stock that is held by noncorporate shareholders
who have owned at least 10 percent of Target's stock for
the last five years , 32 Of course, this narrowly drawn
exemption is itself subject to the classic statutory and
case-law overrides such as assignment of income ,' tax
benefit doctrine, statutory depreciation recapture (e"g"
under sections 1245 and 1250) or similar rules.33 The 5and-10 shareholder and active business prerequisites are
derived from section 311 , which does not, however,
contain a long-term capital gain restriction " This article
focuses on the long-term capital gains limitation to. the
TAX NOTES, March 31 ; 1986
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limited close active business nonrecognition exception

to proposed sections 336-338The House bill technically denies the COrporate level
exemption, otherwise available to Target, to the extentof
qualified stock owne rship (5-and-10 noncorporatesharehO!der rule) in a~ active business corporation, to (1) "any
gain or loss which is an ordinary gain or loss," (2) any
short-term ca,pital gain or loss, and (3)' any gain Target
would recognize upon adisposition of installment obligations within section 453B,34 The House Ways and Means
Committee Report illustrates ordinary gains .a nd losses
with those "derived from inventory items or items held for
sale, to c~st?m~rs , "35 The probable basis.for the ord inarycapital distinction was "that there is no logical basis for
exempting invent<;>ry, whether ornot sold in bulk , or other
assets held for sale to customers in the ,ordinary course
of business , "3~ Indeed, the bulk of testimony at earlier
related h,earings 37 and ofJhe commentary38 agree that
any contmu,e,d section 336-338 exemption from 'gain or
loss recognitIOn should be limited to largely investment
or inflationary derived gains of a small or closely held ,
(target) corporation in a liquidating setting "

The '1985 House proposals intentionally restrict '
the corporate-level exemption to property .. •.
[not sold or exchanged] in the ordinary course
of . .. business.
.,

The 1985 House proposals intentionally re,s trict , the
corporate-level exemption to property of a sort which
Target did not sell or exchange in the ordinary course of
its business., The Com Products doctrine, under one
widely f~lIowed reading, however, extends ordinary income treatment to any operating asset, whether a capital
asset or a depreciable business asset, whose use is
essential to or " integral" to the business., This reading
would largely lim it the revised section 336-338 exemption
t~ T'arget's inves,tment assets, and gain would be recogn Ized on essential , operati ng assets, such as , plant and
equipment, even though Target corporation customarily
did not sell such property in the ordinary course of its
business, Another, contrary reading of Corn Products
~ol~s t~at it does not apply to isolated sales, including a
liquidation sale, of operating assets " Opponents of the
proposed repeal of Gen.eral Utilities ' are virtually unanimous that repeal should not include long-term capital
assets and their argument ,has considerable political
appeal as relief for closely held businesses,,39 It is thus
likely that any reform will retain at least in part an
exemption drawing a capital-ordinary line" Furthermore,
~he conflict, noted above , between integral asset and
Isolated transaction alone demands that the drafters
address the Corn Products issue when such line is finally
drawn ,.
'
The recent proposals of the Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee do not provide relief to the Gen.eral
Utilities repeal at the Target leveL Rather, as supported
by some commentators,4Q relief would b.e providedin
certain acquisitions or liquidations where Target does
not exceed $5 million in the form of a basis increase to
former Target shareholders in their Target stock (thereby
TAX NOTES, March .3 1,1986

reducing shareholder's outside gain on the liquidation or
acquisition)" Such "small " business outside basis increase
would approximate the gain Target recognized on its
long -held capital assets "
III. Corn Products Doctrine
The term "capital asset" is defined by section 1221 as
all " property" held by the taxpayer with f ive enumerated
exceptions, the most important of which focus on inventory and property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business and on installment obligations generated by sales of such assets, The Supreme
Court , however, eng rafted a furthe r exception ont() the
predecessor to section 1221 in Com Products Refining
Co" v" Comrnissioner. 41,
'
"The Com Products Doctri ne has exhib ited an omnidirectional resilience productive of an 'e ndless stream of
litigation over essentially factual issues,"42 in large ,part
because the SupremE:lGourt's opinion didnot.adequately
distinguish wh ich , if any, of the following factors we re
decisive to its conclusion that the corn futures at issue
were not capital assets, resulting Tn ordinary income on
their sale at a gain: (1) The taxpayer, a corn refining
company, recurringly purchased (and subsequ~ntly sold
or exercised depending on the market) corn fuWreS ; (2)
such futures, while not inventory, were a substitute since
they insureda source of corn; (3) the Court agreed with
the Second Circuit and Ta x Court below that the purchases of the futu res were an "integral part!' of the
~axpayer' s , business designed to "hedge" against 'price
Increases In corn ; and (4) the taxpayer's profit from the
sales of the corn futures arose from everyday operation
(whether due to recurring or inventory-like aspects i,s
unclear) and constituted a normal source 'of ,business
income.43
'

Several unresolved Com Products issues may '
pose problems under the prOp'osedprovisions~ ,

Several unresolved Cord Products issues may pose
problems under the proposed provisions.,·One issue'which
Congress should perhaps address is how Corn Products
applies to proposed section 336-338 'transactionsv;'here
Target acquired or holds stock in subsidiai"ies with a
mixed investment-business motive--'-a well-known developIng area,, 44 Potentially much more troublesome , howeve r,
is the largely unacknowledged case':law conflict asto the
role of Corn Products regarding nonrecurring sales of
operating assets . One approach simply looks to whethe r
use of the property is essen~ i al to , and an integral part of ,
the taxpayer's business . If so, Corn Products applies . The
other focuses instead on whether such a sale constitutes
(a) a regular source of the taxpayer's income, making the
doctrine apply, or (b) is a sale totally or partially terminating business assets that the taxpaye r does not customarily sell, thus rendering the doctrine inapplicable
because the sale is not a normal source of business
profits.
A. 'Integral Part' Test
In Corn Products the Supreme Court noted that the
lower court decisions had found that the taxpayer's
1377
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futures transactions were "an integral part of its business
designed to protect its manufacturing operations against
a price increase in its principal raw material and to ensure
a ready supply for future manufacturing' requirements,"45
The Court agreed that the taxpayer;s futures activity was
not separate and apart from itsmanufacturirig operation
and instead was vitally important as a form of ·insurance
against increases.in th~ price of raw corn.. The 'bulk.of the
Com Products progeny.utilizing the term. "necessary and
-integral " qr similar language seem to employ the phrase
as a synonym fOr " business purpose:' forthe .acquisition
and holding of the asset at' issue as contrasted with an .
investment purpose,46
' . '
.
•

.

"',

'.'

,

.-

("'

"I

The cOl.lrt opined that. its approach did ~.not ·
read section 1231 out of the"statute
.
. :.
. .. . '
, "

As,the cas~sgradually extended this ,sort ot nec,essary
and integral analysis, orbetterwords,from .proper.ty held
asa hedge in order to be assured of.rawmaterials (anq
bought and sold regularly) to property di~ect!y used to. ,
acquire raw materials and,finally to:proper tyiJself L!~ed. in
the dire.ct Production of income, with no weight given to '
the frequency of"dlsposition .of such property il} ,the
business ,. the doc.t rine arguably produced J [lcreasiqg.ly ,
wrong .results . For j nstance, ,the tn.en Court of <:;Iaims.ln '
Norton v. United $tates applied Com ,Prqducts to derY,
capital gains treatment to the liquidati}lg sate"bya logging
business of a timber cutting contract, which ensured th,e
taxpayer " a ready source of supply of a logging ,business
raw material , timber:"47 The Court of Claimsfouiid ·that
the timber cutting contract was so integrally related to
the. taxpayer's ordinary business objectives.of Io.gging
ti mber that a "business use" ii'ltElIltion rather than an '
"investment" intent prevailed from acquisitionuritil (Iiqui~
dating) sale . The Norton court relied upon Com Products
notwith~tanqing the taxpayer's conten~ion thatth~ .sale .
represented the concluding phase of liquidating the logging b,usiness,48 While the court opined that its approach
did ,not read seetio!) .12;31 put cif the statute for '.'business
connected " assets,49 that is precisely the result 'that
follows:. wh~re:,the fo~,us is ,o n the)usiness use of the.
property rather .than 011 ' whether its sale constitutes a
normal source of the taxpayer's business income . D isturb~
ihgIY, tt)e districtcourtin Becker Warburg Paribas Group
Inc. v,. UnitedStates 5ri extended Corn Products to aliow .a:
brokerage business an ordinary loss on the saleof one of
its 'stOCk exchange seats .because the ' asseLwas itself
used as an integral part of the primarybusiness. lfis but a.
small step to next apply Coin Products to the disposition
of any business connected 'asset,be it plant, equipment
or intangibles, even goodwill.
'
B. Corn Products and Section 1.2 31: 'Integral Part' and
'Isolated Transaction' Collide
.
Significantly, Nortor" and 13ecker Warburg Pariba:s did'
not involve section 1231 assets. In general , section r231 .
provides for capital gains treatment as to net gains' and
ordinary loss treatment as to net losses upon the sale,
exchange , or involuntary conversion of (a) depreciable
property used in the taxpayer's trade or business and
1378

held for more than six months and (b) real property so
used and held , which in each instance is neither inventory
nor property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business and
does not fall in any other <?f the section 1221-type
exclusions, Section 1231 is significant to the Corn Products doctrine because it has served as the arena for the
conflict between the ordinary course of business and the
integral and necessary part readings of the doctrine even '
though section, 1231 no longer offers much opportunity"
for capital gains S 1
.
The first decisions considering the question concluded '
that the Corn Products doctrine was· inapplicable to section 1231 ;52 the best decision reasoned that by its very,
nature a section 1231 asset is "integral " to the busineSS,53'
so that the doctrine, if applicable, would read the section ,
out of the Code:s4 The Court of Claims particularly had
problems in effectiVely addreSSing the Com Products ~
section 1231 issue since it generally relied on the integral
and necessary act reading . Consequently, that tribunal
held on numerous occasions 'that sales of section 1231
assets were not integral to 'the taxpayer's mainstream
business, even where they were recurring ,55 Moreover,
preservation of these precedents probably led the then'
Court of Claims to develop the following "elaborate
rationale' :56 where property ~which was used in the taxpayer's mainstream business (e .g . , leasing or manufactur':
ing) was al~o sold with regularity: (1) " Primary purpose': '
is determined at time of'sale, (2) in ~ sale-or-rent operation's: " primarily" invokes a contrast, not between sellin g
and renting , but between selling in the ordinary course of '
business and selling outside of that normal course , and
(3) the .regular sales constituted a secondary business .,~7
Such elaborate rationale appears contrary at least to the
spirit of Malat v. Riddell,58 where the Court propounded
its definition of "primarily" for section 122159 as "of first
importance" or "principally" in the context of apartment·
projects apparently developed for rental purposes or;
selling ; whichever was more profitable; where prior deci ~
sions by-and-Iarge had found ordinary income because '
the sales in such "dual purpose" areas were a "substan~ '.
tial " part of the mainstream business.so While 'Malatap- ,'
pears not to bea dual purpose case, but rather an
undeCided purpose case ,Sl. read against the preceding .
sell-or-rentcases its clear import is that where a taxpayer
truly has a dual motive, e',g" primarily to use the property
in rentals or manufacturing , with a lesser purpose of sale', ;
the property is not heJd primarily for sale . 62 The Court·of '
Claims' rationale thus is flawed . If the taxpayer regularly
sells such property not held primar.ily for sale , such sales
constitute a normal source of business income and Corn .
Products should apply, notwithstanding that such prop~"
erty literally qualifies asa "capital asset."
The leading case applying Com Products to section
1231 assets, HollyWood Baseball Association v. Commissioner,63 unfortunately relied upon an integral testdefined as "carried on to protect or to allow the functio n
of the taxpayer's true business . "Yet the sales there ,of
baseball player contracts by a farm club on the demand
of a major league club in fact were substantially recurring
and constituted a major source of income to the taxpayer .
Hence, the court could easily have rested on the ordinary
course-recurring tack or even that the player contracts
were held primarily for sale.64 . Indeed, commentators.
have pointed to section 1231 as pr.oof for the proposition
that the integral act reading of Corn Products is overly
broad . 65
TAX NOTES, March 31, 1986
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Several decisions contrary to the "integral act" approach have found Corn Products factually inapplicable
fo section 1231 property used as an integral part of the
business by focusing on whether the sale of such property was a regular transaction . For example, the Tax
court in Shea 's Estate v. Commissioner66 held that the
taxpayer's sale of a ship charter (a bilateral contract
granting the taxpayer the right, and the obligation, to
transport cargo by sea for a five-year period for the
charterer) was not subject to the Com Products doctrine
because the sale of the charter "was not a regular transaction as a part of the business .. .. . In fact , it was highly
unusual, the sale of the charter separately resulting
solely from the destruction of the vessel by accident. The
sale stemmed from the decision . . ..to cease business." In
short , the transaction was not a normal source of business income . Save for the fact that the charter contract in
Shea's Estate was amortizable over the five-year period
and , hence, a section 1231 asset, while the timber cutting
contract in Norton was not depreciable and , hence, not a
section 1231 asset , the two cases appear factually indistinguishable, yet conflicting decisions resulted .67 Moreover, the Tax Court refused in Guggenheim v. Commissionef'3 8 to apply Corn Products to a partial termination of
a business , i.e., a sale of part of the operating assets (a
part interest in depreciable livestock held for breeding
purposes , a section 1231 asset), on the grounds that the
sale was not for the purpose of furthering the horsebreeding business. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit In Nelson
Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissionef'39 in a non section
1231 asset case ruled the doctrine inapplicable to an
"isolated" sale of a mortgage service contract , which had
provided over half of the taxpayer's business of servicing
mortgages for lenders, on the ground that in Corn Products the taxpayer regularly dealt in corn futures as part of
its everyday business operations . The results in Guggenheim and Nelson Weaver Realty contrast strongly with
the result obtained in Becker Warburg Paribas.

As a practical matter, the courts in general
were very reluctant to apply Corn Products to
section 1231 assets unless sales were substantially recurring . ...

Clearly, as a practical matter, the courts in general
were very reluctant to apply Corn Products to section
1231 assets unless sales were substantially recurring,
and even then the courts frequently resorted instead to
"elaborate rationales" as to the taxpayer's primary purpose. Conversely, some tribunals were considerably less
reluctant to rely on Corn Products where nonsection
1231 assets were involved . However, since the decisions
did not explicitly turn on the class of asset, but rather in
effect on the test applied-integral use vs . isolated salethe problem remains. As the above survey amply illustrates , if we disregard the class of asset (section 1231
asset or not) and whether gain or loss was involved, the
cases are impossible to reconcile, with different treatment,
according to the Com Products test utilized , of (1). a
contract used by one taxpayer to obtain timber processed
in its logging businesses, a contract used by another taxTAX NOTES, March 31, 1986

payer to obtain cargo to be shipped in its shipping
business, and a contract used by still another to provide
services in its mortgage servicing business, and (2)
iivestock used to produce offspring in a livestock breeding
business, a stock exchange seat used to sell property or
services to customers in a brokerage business, and
surely improved real estate (plant or offices, apartments)
used to manufacture or held for rental in a manufacturing
or rental business .
In a choice between (a) an "integral and necessary act"
reading of Corn Products , focusing in effect on the
degree of business necessity, and (b) a reading Ii'miting
the doctrine to dispositions of property of the type sold in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business, albeit not
held primarily for such purpose (with perhaps a slight
modification for property acquisitions made in lieu of a
deductible or amortizable business expenditure 70 ) , the
latter approach is necessary to preserve section 1231 (or
better what is left of it) and the chief proposed exemption
to revised sections 336-338 . 71 And if the recurring reading
is proper for section 1231 operating assets , it should be
equally proper for nonsection 1231 operati ng assets.
Although commentators have offered many other formulations and refinements of the Corn Products doctrine
(often attempting to reconcile the myriad cases), 72 the
above conflicting positions are those most frequently
utilized by the courts as to assets other than stock .
However, which approach, if either, is correct is not
decisive for purposes of this art icle . The possibility that
cases so in conflict might apply to new sections 336-338
demands that the drafters of the statute, or more appropriately the Committee Reports, explicitly address the
manner in which the Corn Products doctrine should
apply to these provisions. Otherwise, the certainty or
simplification goal of tax reform 73 is lost here. Moreover;
as long as the broad integral act precedents are not
overruled , the common-law process 74 creates substantial
risk that Corn Products will be applied improperly in
revised sections 336-338 transactions to section 1231
assets and other assets which are integrally used in business operations but not sold in everyday business operations..
,.

C. Corn Products and Existing Section 337
Section 337 exempts gain from the corporate tax if the
gain is realized on qualifying sales or exchanges of
property, a term defined in section 337(.b). Cases arose,
however, in which courts thought it improper to exempt
the gain because it would have been taxed under case
law doctrines, such as the assignment of income doctrine,
had section 337 not appeared to be applicable .. Some
decisions, notably Pridemark, Inc. v.. Commissioner 75
held that section 337 did not apply. The Pridemarkcourt
reached that result by holding an item was .property
under section 337 only if it would be a capital asset under
section 1221 . The court reasoned that (1) neither section
337 nor section 1221 was intended to allow corporate income from normal operations to escape the full corporate
tax, and (2) the section 337 definition of property closely
paralleled the section 1221 definition of property which
was impliedly adopted by the Congress . 76 Later decisions,
however, properly refused to equate these two provisions
and therefore restricted " property" for section 337 only to
the extent set forth in section 337(b) .n Instead, wisely
following a functional approach (to achieve "parity" between existing sections 336 and 3377 8 ), theyapplied such
1379
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case-law doctrines directly to section 337 where appropriate..
"
. .
The Ninth Circuit in Hollywood Baseball AssocIatIon
also declined to equate sections 1221 and 337, but did
apply the Corn Products doctrine to section 337. Unfortunately, the'decision was quite cryptic . Onthe one hand,
Hollywood BasebiJ.ii at different points noted that the
policy underlying section 1221 (and section 1231) was
not intended "to give preferential treatment to profits and
losses arising from the everyday operation of the business,"79 and similarly that the policy behind section 337
was to derly exemption to "sales in the ordinary course of
business " .as ifthe corporation were not in the process
of liquidating ,. " 8o On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit did
not turn its decision on these stated policies. Rather,
similarly to the subsequently discredited Pridemark reasoning, it saw the development of section 337 from the
House to the Senate version as "[p]erhaps " .. made in
order to make the language of section 337 more nearly
approximate the language of sections 1221 and 1231 . If
so, it would seem to follow that Corn Products is applicable to section 337."81 Moreover, by relying on a Corn
Products "integral" reasoning rather than the ordinary
course of business reading, Hollywood Baseball raised
the possibility that secJion 337 would be eviscerated as to
integral operating assets . Indeed , when the Tax Court
finally rejected Pridemark in favor of applying the existing
section 336 case-law overrides (assignment of income in
the case at bar) to existing section 337, it distinguished
Hollywood Baseball on the ground that the sale of
Target's mortgage servicing contracts in the.case before
it was not a prerequisite to the conduct of the taxpayer's
business . 82 (The Tax Court appears unaware that it follows
conflicting readings of Corn Products , although quick to
note disagreement as to the doctrine between judges on
the Court of Claims,. 83 )

Corn Products too often works as a one-way
street . . .[with taxpayersreporting1 sales producing gain as capital . . .and sales producing
loss as ordinary loss.

Commentators differed asto whether the Corn Products
doctrine should apply to section 337; with those in favor
pointing to the similarity in policy of ?enying prefe~ential
treatment to ordinary course of business transactlons,84
and those opposing its application relying on the policy
of encouraging parity between existing sections 336 (to
which the doctrine presumably would not apply) and
33785 The absence of post-HollywoodBaseball decisions
applying Corn Products to either section 1231 assets or
to section 337 transactions could indicate a conscious
deciSion by the Commissioner and the Justice Department not to utilize the integral read ing in these contexts .86
More likely, such absence reflects their belated awareness
that Corn Products too often works as a one-way street:
taxpayers tend to report sales prodUCing gain of otherwise
capital assets as capital gain (and escape audit and
challenge) and sales p'roducing loss as ordinary loss.87
Whether the government could resist the opportunity to
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rely on an " integral" argument as to operating assets in
new sections 336-338 is nevertheless problematic.88
IV. Corn Products and Proposed Sections 336-338
H ..R.. 3838, in practical effect, would codify Pridemark
by continuing General Utilities only for .sectio~ 337 "liquidating " distributions of long term capital gain property
The bill WOUld, however, effect parity between section
337, on the one hand , and sections 336 and 338, on the
other hand, by also eliminating General Utilities for short
term capital gain and ordinary income property in trans~
actions falli ng under ,Sections 336 and 338. General
Utilities thus would pe left to exempt gain on long term
capital assets of closely held active businesses . Such a
limitation would seem certain to raise the question
whether Corn Products applied to those sections in light
of the fact that it was applied to section 337 although the
statutory equivalence between sections 337 and 1221
was not nearly so great as it would be between proposed '
sections 336-338 and section 1221 . Furthermore, the
application of Corn Products to section 337 produced
results that were not on a parity89 with the results under
section 336 and pre-1982 sect ion 334(b )(2) ,. In the revised .
scheme under the proposed sections , parity would seem
to be a stronger, more conscious aim, and Corn Products
would have to be applied to sections 336-338 to achieve '
it. Clearly any continued exemption should not be available for property customarily sold by Target in the
ordinary course of its business , although not held primarily for such sale To this extent Corn Products or a
similar doctrine is needed . But the doctrine should not be
applied merely because an otherwise long-term capital ~r ;
section 1231 asset is integral to Target corporation s .
business .
Hopefully, the drafters will focus on the conflicting ,
readings of the doctrine in this context-integral ass~t ~s .
nonrecurring sale-and explicitly stake out a pOSition ,
presumably in the legislative history. Otherwise, even
after Target meets the quite technical "qualified stock.
ownership" and "active business" tests (itself a quagmire
of conflict) and threads its way through the maze of statutory and case-law recapture income rules, Target:s ad ~
visers must plumb the seemingly endless, conflicting
Corn Products progeny to determ ine whether the corporate level exemption is available , When you consider that
(a) the revised sections 336-338 rules governi,ng transactions involving widely held Target corporations , which
presumably would have access to expert and diligent tax
advice , would be relatively simple , and (b) closely held
Targets would be less likely to have such ready access, or
even realize it is needed, th e n the true perversity of the
proposed regime begins to unfold ., At least the drafters
could still avoid the Corn Products trap for the unwary.
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Barry Forman , Tax Notes, March 18, 1985, pp ,.
1162-1166.
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FOOTNOTES
'''Target'' is used in text and footnotEis to refer to both (a) a
corporation whose assets or stock are purchased or acquired by
a purchasing corporation , and (b) a corporation distributing in a
complete liquidation its assets to its shareholders for them to
continue to operate in noncorporate form .
'Such basis includes under Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U .S. 1
(1947), any future, e.g . , instailment, payments to bE" made by
purchasing .corporation and any Target liabilities assumed , or
taken subject to, by pur,chasing corporation , see Meyerson v.
comm'r, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), but probably not in excess of the
fair market value. of the acquired Target's assets. See Estate of
Franklin v. Comm 'r, 544 F.2d 1Q45 (9th Cir. 1976); see generally
Andrews, On Beyond Tufts , 61 Taxes94!3 (1983) .
'.
3Such attributes include the laundry list contained in section
381 (c) , principally "earnings and profits" and . "n,et operating
losses" and carryovers .of other credits, as well as various tax .
elections
. .
.,
'.
.
'If Target sells the inventory of one of its businesses d\,Jring
.the 12-month period following the adoption of its plan of
complete liquidation other than to a single purchaser in asingle
transaction, the otherwise available shield of present section
337(a) is "lifted ." Sections 337(b)(l)(A) and (2) . This r~quire
ment creates a "broken lot of inventory" discontinuityvyith an
existing section 338 election . See Ginsburg , Ta,xingyorporate
Acquisitions, 38 Tax L.Rev. 171 , 279 (1983) ("Ginsburg , 38 Tax
L. Rev . ") Notwithstanding the literal .language o(existing sections 337(b) and 336, courts and the Servic.e through the caselaw and statutory " recapture i[lcome" doctrines and i>rovrsioris
tax a liquidating corporation (whether distributing its assets' or
selling them) on certain items . Seen6te 33 infra . .
' Section 331 (a) . This assumes that (a) Target is not "collapsible" under section 341 (b) or thi'!! section 341 (e)(4) applies,
see present section 337(c)(l); and . (b) the stock is a ."capital
asset" in the shareholder's h.ands . This requirement too Ciln
caLlse discontinuity between.an asset acquisition (existingsec~ .
tion 337) and a stock acquisition (existing section 338) . See
Ginsburg, 38 Tax. L. Rev., supra at 254-255. For excellent policy
discussions of the possibility of repeal of th.e 'collapsible corpo-.
ration provisions if the General Utilities doctrine were completely .
repealed also, see Ginsburg, . Collapsib/eCo'rpof'ations-.
Revisiting on Old Misfortune , 33 Tax L Rev. 309,325-328 (1978)';
Staff of Senate Finance Committee , Pr,eliminary Report, The
Reform & Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations,
S. Print 98-95, 98th Cong o 1st Sess . 33-34 (1983) ("Senate
Finance Staff, Preliminary Report") .
.6lnstallment reporting permits a taxpayer to ratably offset
basis against principal payments as received (usually in present
and) in future year(s) . Section 453(c) . An inadequate rate of interest usually triggers the time value of money niles..
.
. ' Section 453(h)(1)(A) ,. See generaliy Newman, Structuring the
Sale of the Closely Held Corporate Business.:' Alternate -Strategies, 41 NYU. Inst on Fed . Tax., (vol. 1)3-1,3-32-3-33 (1'983f
Prior to the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Public Law
96-471, the receipt of the purchasing corporation's " purChaser'
evidences of indebtedness" constituted payment in the year of
such. receipt to Target shareholders to the extent of their fair
market value . See Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment,
30 Tax L. Rev . 469, 484 (1975) . This pre-1980 section 337
discontinuity with installment stock purchase of "c6n~rol" of
Target corporation by purchasing corporation followed by section 332 liquidation of Target resulting in a section 334(b)(2)
"cost-basis" in the assets was the policy basis of Rushing v.
Comm 'r , 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir,. 1971), and its progeny (permitting shareholder-level installment reporting upon sale of Target
stock to third person who effects liquidation of Target and sale
of its assets), effectively .overruled where the third party is
related by the second disposition "rules" of section 453(e) . See
S Rep No . 96-1000, 96th Cong . 2d . Sess , 13-14 (1980), reprinted
in 1980-2 C.B. 494, 500-01 .
.
· Under present section 338(g)(1) purchasing corporation must
elect section 338 by the 15th day of the ninth month beginning
after the month in which it acquired 80 percent of Target's stock
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("acquisition date") , Under the "asset consistency" rules of
present section 338(e), a cost-basis acquisition by purchasing
corporation or any affiliate of assets from Target or any affiliate,
unless sold in the ordinary course of business, during an up to
three-year or more "consistency period," present section 338(h)
(4)(A) and (B), triggers a deemed section 338 election .. The antiselectivity consistency rules have been criticized asa great
source of complexity as well as misdirected . Ginsburg, 38 Tax L ,
Rev. supra at 299-300. Temporary section 338regulations,
through an elaborate web of rewards and punishment, generally
turn such asset acquisition into a carryover basis (jcquisition ,
thereby not triggering a deemed election, .unless purch,lsing
corporation affirmatively elects a cost-basis in such assets. Seip
Temp _ Reg. section 1. 338-4T(F)(6)(iv) Q & A No . l ;Preambleto
Q & A 's Relating to Domestic Matters Und~r Section 338, 50 Fed .
Reg . 16403-04 (April 25, 1985) . See generally Wellen, A Roadmap
to Section 338, 28 Tax Notes ~61 (July 22, 1985) .
9Existing section 338(a)(2)
.
'OExisting sections 338(b)(1) and (2) provide the new Target
corporation's aggregate basis in old Target's "acquisition date"
assets consists of (a) the "grossed up" basis of Target's stock
"recently' ; purchaseq by purchasing corporation (i ,e., purChased
during the 12-month acquisition pedbd, ~ existing section 338(b)
(6)(8)) , and (b) purchasing corporation's basis in all other
Target stock, section 338(b)(6)(8). with both adjl,lste9 for Ta:r get's liabilities and "other relevantitems ." Such ,liabilitiei'sinclude
old Target's tax liability as to "recapture income." S. Rep . No . 97~
494, Vo l. I, 97th Gong . 2d Sess. 193 (Hi82) ; Temp . Tre·as. Reg:
section 1.338(b)-1T(f)(l) .
.
If purchasing corporation acquires 80 percent, but less than
100 percent, of Target's stbck by the end of'tlle "acquisition
date" and elects existing sectiori 338, two rules deal with the
presence of remaining minority Target shareholders: (1) The
"gross-up" rule of existing section 338(b)(4) ' increases new
Target's deemed purch'ase price as if the purchasJng corpo'ration had pu rchased .l 00 percent of Target's stock at the average
per share price that it purchased the "recently purchased "
Target stock . (2) As a "surrogate" toU charge fqr the ' proportionate outside Target shareholder tax that is not tdggered
where purchasing corporation purchases lesS than 100 perce:~t
of Target's stock, the deemed section 337 shield as, iOQld
Target's deemed bulk sale is proportionately lifted totheexfent
that purchasing corporation does not acquire through' purchase
or certain redemptions th.e remaining stock in new Target corporation held by minority old ' Target sha'r eholders within a .12month lookforward after the acquisition date . Existing section's
338(c)(1) and (h)(7) . This lifting of the present deemed seCtion
337 bulk sale shield also does not applyif new Tilrget corporation is liquidated within such 12-month lookforward, provided
that suth minority shareholders do not elec~ S'ection'333 . ~xis.ting
section 338(c)(l). ·
. "
"
" Existing section 338(a)(l) . " Recapture income" overrides
such deemed section 337 shield just as it would an actual section 337 sale by Target, indeed, exira~ting this Target ievel toll
charge was the purpose of the deemed bulk section 337 sale in
the statute , Joint Committee Staff, General Explanation of tlie
Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, Pub . Law 97-248, 97th Cong . 2d Sess . 133 (1982).
"Recapture income" is further :discussed in note 33 infra
'2This assumes that section 341 (a) is inapplicable and ti1e
stock is a capital asset in the hands of . the selling Target
shareholders. See note 5 supra .
OSee generally Staff of Senate Finance Committee, Final
Report, The Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985, S. Print No .. 99~
47, 99th Cong , 1st Sess . 34 (1985) (" Senate Finance Staff, Final
Report") .'
.
" Section 334(b)(1) .
" Section 361 (a) . This statement assumes no .u ndistributed
corporate level "boot" or nonqualifying property. Section 361 (b) .
See generally Carlson , Boot at the Corporate Level in Tax~Free
Reorganizations , 27 Tax L Rev 499 (1972) .
....
.
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'6Sections 354 and 358. Receipt of nonqualifying property in
addition to stock in purchasing corporation is taxed at Target
shareholder lev~1 under section 356 .
" See Senate Finance Staff, Preliminary Report, supra at 83;
American Law Institute, Federal Incoll1e Tax Project: Subchapter
C, 34-36 (19!\2) .
.
.
.
'8Joint Committee Staff, Analysis of Federal Income Tax
Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, excerpt~d in 2tTax Notes
190 (April 8, 1985).
.
.
'9The statutory definitional requirements and the overriding
case-law requirements of continuity of interest at the shareholder and corporate levels for the five basic acquisitive reorganizations, " A, "Jorward and reversetri a"'igula r" A~s , " " B" and
" C, " (apart from .the insolvency reorganization (" G" ) render
many commonplace acquisitive transactions far easier toa<;.complish in cost-basis acquisitions than in carryover .basis reorganiza:
tions, even apart from the tax considerations discussed in notes
20 a(1d 21 infra and accoiTIpariying te x.~
.'
,
The'twin nonstatutory requireme nts Of (1) continuity of shareholder interest and (2) continui"ty of business enterpr;se cdlipleo
with their sporadic and varied codification in some but not a'IIof
section 368's reorganization defiflitiqns inmanifestalions ona) a
requirem.ent of votingpurchasing ' co'rporation siock as c6n~ '
sideratioD for Target's stock .or assets' (" B," ".C," andrEwerse triangular "A") .and./ n some<;iise~ that.purchaiingcorpdratiqnqr
its subsidiary acquired 80 percent control' of Target ("B " and
reverse trian'g ular "A"L in one step in the case of a' reverse triarigular :'A", which codif / the sha ~ehold,er' level cOriti.n uiJY of intE1 rest requirement; and (b) the requi(em ent that purChasirig corpo ~
rati q n requi re "substantially all oUhe properties" of target (" C':
and both 'iriangular " A" reorganizations) c(jn'stitut\'ltheprincip~I '
sources of the problems in this area. See': Sehate Finan'ce Staff,
Preliminary Report, 'supra at 27-29, Due to the (iifferences fhat
the various formulations of ,these iequirement,s, play in lti¢
different reorganizations, the definitions " defy raiion'alizatior\';
Senate Finance Slaff, Pr.~/iniina!Y' Report, .supra at 27. These.
varying requirements cause differengesin' w~ich reorganizations
may be ulilized. with 'respect to (1) consideration permitted; (2 }
"creepinga.c quisitions" (purch~sing corpora'tionacquires stock"
in Target either for cash or voting stock in purchasirt9qQrpdratio l1 over a p,eriod or time) ; (;3) disposition of unwanted 'a:sseis '~ y
TCj ~geti,11 ~nti c ipatiol1 oUts !'l~quisi~iOr:d4}paYin.ent~ by PW~
Chqsif")g ' corporation " or Target ~o dissenting sh ~ reh9Iders ' in
Target; (,sr slirvival of Target's NO.L ' sund ~ r pre-19,76.rLJles ,(stil!
in ~ffe.ctthr()ugh 1985) ; (a) SLJr~ ival of Targetasan entityand (7)
the applicable rules. both as fqqualification and as lo .fa'xation of
Tar get w~ereTarget's tiabiHties are assumedby th:e purcl)asirtg
corporation ,
.
.
' Onlyan "A" and. a forvvardtriang~l;ir "A" permit considerable,
flexibiHty as to consider~tion .Le, : forthis purpose the .trimsac-:
tiof) must meE'!ton IY thecoinmon~law "continuity of interest;" for
ruling purpose's a 50 ' percent¢ontinuingeqiJity interest in
purchasing corporalionby former Target sharehoiders' (everi
including nonvpting.preferred purchasing corporation s tock} In
contr?st, qnly voting purchasing cprpo"ration stock maybe
utilized in a "B," "C;:' af)d rever~e triangular "Aw reorganization
with varying amounts of " boot" permitted in those three reorganizations, See generally Dean & Egerton , AcqtJisitiveReorganizations: The Other Method of Buy!ng and Selling a Corporate Business, 27 U Fla: l. Rev . 935,936-939 (1975); Dailey,
The Voting Stock Requiremeilt of B andCReorganizations ; 26
Tax L. Rev . 725 (1971) . Howiong before and .a ftei"t!le acquisition
Target shareholders must hold .the.ir stock is unclear. .See Senate
Finance Staff, Final Repo"rt, supra at 40. .
.
" Creeping acquisitions," I.e , mUlti-stage acquisitions of Target
stock by purchasingcorporation are possible in "A," forward triangular "A" and "B"reorganiza!iofl, but such piecemeal acquisi-'
tions pose separate problems in "c" and intense problems' in
reverse triangular " A" reorganizations . See generally Leiin ' &
Bowen , Taxable and Tax-Free Two-Step Acquisitions and Minority Squeeze-Outs" 33 ' Tax L Rev. 425 (1978) ; MacLean,
Creeping Acquisitions, 21 Ta x' L Rev. 345 (1966) .
Unwanted Target assets may be disposed of by Target prior to
an acquisitive merger (including through a tax-free division
under section "355) , see N ..Y. State Bar Ass'n, Report on the
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Ancillary Tax Effects of Diffe rent Forms of Reorganizations , 34
Ta x L Rev . 475, 528 (197 9), with o ut rai sing qual ificat ion requirements only in a " A" and a " B" (assuming that Targ et can meet
th e continuity business enterprise test at the time of th e acquisition) . See Senate Finance Staff, Preliminary Report, supra at 28;
Senate Finance Staff, Final Report, supra at 39 . The "substantiall Y'
all" requirem ent in both triangular "A's" and "c" precludes pre~
merger disposition of substantial operating asset s Se e Cook &
Coalson, The "Substantiality of the Prope rties " Requirement fn
Triangular Rl;iorganizations-A Current View , 35 Ta x Law. 303
(1982) . See generally, Buchholz, Disposing of Unwanted Asset~
in Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, 33 Tax Law, 161 (1984).
A failed sec ond step merger may also disqualify the initial sec ~:
tion 355 transaction . Prop. Trea s, Reg . section t .355-2(c }( 2} ,
Subject to the common-law shareholder continuity of interest"
test , Target shareholder dissenters to Target's acquisition may
be paid with cash from pu rchasing corporation or Ta rget in a "A"
or forward triangula r " A" (although payments by Target in a'
forward triangular " A" may cause Target to fail the " substantially '
all " test cf. Treas, Reg , section 1.368-2(j)(7} Ex,(3}} . Dissente'rs
may be paid by Target in a " B," but never by purchasing
corporation . Disse.nters in a "c" theoretically may be paid cash
by purqhasing corporation , up ~o 20 percent of the total consideration , section 368(b}(2j(B} , but the reality of havingt.o'
cOLJnt Target liabilities against the 20 ' percent boot relaxation'
rule , id, flush sentence, renders that rule ineffective, Target may"
pay dissenters subject to the substantially all requirement in'a'
reverse tri"angular " A," Under "current" NOL rules (I.e , the pr~1976 rules applic'a ble to 'at leasr1985) patently inconsistent rules
apply with " B" and triangular "As " with careful planning avoiding;
comple"tely the limitations, subject theh of course to th e cbn ~
solidated return SRL Y rules . See n.25, infra , for House's pro:"
posed revision of section 382.
". "
Also, survival of Target as an entity is possible onl y in a " B,"
reverse' triangular " A," and an "A" reorganization in which
purchasing corporation disappears. The rules on the tax effeCt
of assumption of Target's liabilities by purchasing corporation ,
as well as who can' pay Target's reo rganization expenses, appear'
hopelessly unprincipled and confused under current law. See
Freling & Martin , Current Reorganization Techniques , 55 Taxes
852, 860-861 (1977) ; Dailey, supra at 754-58; Macon , Factorsto .a
Tax ~ Free Acquisition Reorganization; Rights to Acquire Stock,"
Subsequent Mergers ~f Acquiring Corporation; CollateralAr~::
rangements , 32 NY U. Inst. on Fed , Ta x, 549, 554-557 (1974)i
Surely, any reform el iminating these comple xities is preferable;
'
even if some terms are left for future developments.
2°"Leverage" is shorthand for debt-financing
2' ''The current combination of lTC, depreciable basis, an,d
acceleration of depreciation for three-year and five-year ACRS
property was ...... designed to yield tax benefits equal to thos'e'
produced by expensing capital costs or exempting capital in ~
come ." Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, ' Debt, 'and Tal
Arbitrage, 38 Ta x Law. 549, 554 (1985) ; see Steines , Income Tax
Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TCj x L. Rev. 483, 537-538
(1985) . This effect coupled with leverage may be viewed as the
equivalent of combining ihterest deductibility with ta x-e xempt
income, i.e., tax "arbitrage . " Warren, supra , ,at 563.
.'
22 Section 338 clearly precludes Target from using any of th e
affiliate9 group's NOL's to offset Target's "recaptu re income".
arising from the deemed section 337 sale. See H.R. Rep. No, 9?~ ,
760, 97th Cong o 2d Sess. 537 , 539 (1982); Ginsburg , 38 Tax C
Rev. supra at 268-269 . Commentators initially feared that Target.
might not be able to use its own NOL's to" offset" its " recapture
income" since new Target corporation is a new taxpayer with a
clean slate . See Ginsburg , 38 Tax L. Rev . supra at 272 ; Ferguson,
& Stiver, Taxable Corporate Acquisitions after TEFRA , 42 N. Y.n
Ins!. on Fed . Ta x. (Part I) 12-1 , 12-53 (1984) . The tempo rary
regulations fortunately provide that Target's attri butes , in cluding
NOLs, may be carried over to , and carried ba c k from , the
deemed sale return, which is deemed to occur in a separate taxable year . Temp Reg . section 51.338-1 (f}(;3}(iv) . Moreover, sec-'
tion 382(a} (as "currently" in effect) does not apply solely
because of the operation of secti o n 338 to bar a NOL carryover
to old Targ et's final return.. Temp . Reg . sect ion 1 338-4T (k}(3} Q
& A No . 1. Howeve r, the tempora ry regulations in determining
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the Target attributes that can be carried over apply the dis-

affiliation....,..deconsolidation rules of Treas. Reg . sections 1 150221 and 1 1502-79. These regulations carvE! out the separateNOl
attributable to Target. Hence, minor discontinuity remains Inan
'a ctual section 337 sale by a Target which isa member of an
affiliated group, the entire group's NOl could offset Target's
"recapture income" Whereas, in a section 338 election following
a qualified stock acquisition, only the portion of the affiliated
group's NOl attributable to Target itself (or Target and its
subsidiaries) can offset the "recapture income" arising from the
deemed section 337 sale.
23See generally Joint Committee Staff, Tax Reform . Propos'a/s:
Corporate Taxation , 49-50 (JCS-40-85, September 19, 1985);
Senate Finance Staff, Final Report, supra at 38.
24 Compare Sheppard, General Utilities Repeal and Dynasty,
30 Tax Notes 85,.86 (Jan. 13, 1986), quoting a merger expert to
the effect that current tax rules affected form of merger only with
Statements of David H. Brockway, Chief of Staff of Joint Committee and of Ronald A Pearlman, Assistant Treasury Secretary
for Tax Policy at Hearing on Tax Aspects ·.of Mergers and
Acquisitions, quoted in 27 Tax Notes 122, 123, respectively
(April 8, 1985) and Staff 9f Joint Committee, Analysis of Federal
Income Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, excerpted in
27 Tax Notes 191 (April 8, 1985); H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, 99th
Cong . 1st Sess. 281-282 (1985) .
25 [H .R. 3838] alters the character of the special limitations on the use of NOl carryforwards. After a change in
ownership of more than 50 percent of the Jalue of stock in
a loss corporation , however effected, the taxable income
available for offset by pre-acquisition NOls is limitedtoa
prescribed rate times the value of the loss corporation;s
equity . In addition , NOls are disall.owed unless the los's
corporation satisfies the continuity-of"business-enterprise
rule that appl ies to tax-free reorganizations for the twoyear period following an ownership change, regardless of
the type of transaction that results in the . change of
control (Le,. , the continuity-of-business-enterprise doctrine
is made applicable to purchase transactions for NOl
carryover purposes) The bill also expands the scope of
the special limitations to include built-in losses and takes,
into account built-in gains. The bill includes other
changes, of a more technical nature, including rules
relating to the measurement of beneficial ownership" The
bill applies similar rules to carryforwards other than NOls,
such as net capital losses and excess foreign tax credits
H .R. Rep " No. 99-426, supra at 263 .
26The estimated increased budget receipts from H,R" 3838's
partial repeal of General Utilities are $471 million in 1986, $441
million in 1987, $171 million in 1988, $991 million in 1989, and
$1 ,967 million in 1990. ld. at 291, '
.
. 2' For a survey of these proposed provisions and their general
background, critical of any continued exemptions: see Sheppard ,
General Utilities Repeal and Dynasty, 30 Tax Notes 85 (Jan. 13,
1986) .
'· See Senate Finance Staff, Preliminary Report,supra at 33.
'9 General Utilities & Operating Co . v. Helvering, 296 U,S. 200
(1935), involved a dividend distribution of appreciated property
by a continuing corporation ., The case before the Court was rife
with procedural problems rendering a determination of the
actual holding difficult. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax
Reform, Proposals, Corporate Ta.xation 35 (Sept 19, 1985)
(hereinafter "Corporate Tax Reform Proposals" ) , longpromulgated regulations already shielded a liquidating corporation from taxation of gain on appreciated property in a corporate
liquidation , See Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated
Property: The Case for Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine ,
22 San Diego L Rev 81, 82 (1985) ,
30 E.g ., Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra at 33 .
3'The proposed statutory format is to treat at the inside
Corporate level a liquidating distributi9r1 generally as a recog- '
nized sale at fair market value , with limited exceptions, Prdpqsed
section 336(a) " Where Target's liabilities exceed tlie actual: fair
market value of its distributed assets, fair market value is
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deemed to equal such liabilities. Proposed section 336(e)(l) in
effect thus codifi.es Tufts v,. Comm 'r, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), in this
context. Section 311 (c) already provided a roughly similar rule
as to redemptions and dividends Then proposed sections 337
(sales of target assets pursuant to a liquidation) and 338 (sales
of target stock with cost-basis election by the purchasing corporation as to Target's assets) provide for nonrecognition by
Target corporation to the extent gain or loss would riot be
recognized under proposed section 336, if Target corporation
had distributed all of its assets in liquidation . Proposed sections
337(a) and 338(c) .
3'Proposed section 336( c)( 4) incorporates the slightly modified
from present law new section 311 (c)(l) definition of "qualified
stOCk," viz., a non corporate shareholder owning 10 percent or
more of Target's stock throughout a fiv€!-yearlook-back period'
(or Target's existence if shorter) . Proposed section 336(c)(5) 's
definition of "qualified active business corporation" parallels
one of the three alternative section 311 active business defini~
tions (section 311 (e)(2»: a five-year actively conducte,d business not acquired in a cost-basis transaction within a five-year
look-back period and no "drop down " (by section 351 or contribution to capital) of substantial nonbusiness assets during
such period Additionally, unlike :sectiori 3n, the limited proposed section 336 shield does not extend to (1) ordinary gain or
loss, (2) a short term capital gain or loss, or (3) installment
obligations generated by the sale of such assets , Propose'd section 336(c)(2) .
Since a major impetus for repeal of the General Utilities
prinCiple codified in present sections 336-338 is tliat it allows
"assets to take a stepped-up basis without the imposition of a
corporate-level tax," Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra at
46, not surprisingly. exceptions to the new general corp9rate
level recognition rule are provided where the distributeehasa
carryover, rather than cost, basis, viz. , (a) a section 332 liquidation of an at least 80 percent owned subsidiary by its corporate
parent and (b) either an acquisitive reorganization under section
368 or divisive reorganization under section 355 . See Proposed
sections 336(b)(1) and (d); H.R. Rep. No. 99-426,99th Cong . 1st
Sess. 283, 285 (1985) .
.
33H ..,R Rep. No. 99-42p, supra at 285 ("[T]he committee does
not intend to supersede other existing statutory rules and
judicial doctrines (includin.Q .. but not limited to , section 1245and
section 1250 recapture, the tax benefit doctrine, and the assignment of income doctrine)" . ) See Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra at 40-44, for a concise discussion of these and
other overrides of the present law general ru.le of nonrecognition
in this area. For a laundry list of "statutory recapture"items see
Ferguson & Stiver, supra at 1-30 n . 76.
34 Proposed section 336(c)(2) .
.
35 H"R Rep . No, 99-426, supra at 284,. The quoted passage is
technically inaccurate in that property held pril)1arily for .s~l,e ,
but not in the ordinary course of ,business .. enjoys capital gains
treatment. See , e.g., Thomas v. Comm 'f', 254 F .2d 233, 236' (5th .
Cir . 1958); Howell v, comm 'r, 57 T.C. 546, 555(1972) .
' .
36CorporateTax Reform Proposals, supra. at 51. .
3' See summaries of testimony, at Hearing on (Preliminary)
Staff of Senate Finance Committee, Reform andSimplifica'tion
of the Income Taxation of Corporations, S, Print No . 98-95, 98th
Cong " 1st Sess , (Sept 22, 1983), contained in Senate Finance
Staff, Final Report, supra at 6 0.,24 .
3·See e,.g,., BeCk, Distributions in Kind in Corporate Liquidations A Defense of General Utilities , 38 Tax law. 663, 675-676
(1985); Nolan , Taxing Corporate Distributions of AppreCiated
Property: Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine and ' Relie(
Measures, 22 San Diego L Rev. 97, 98, 101 · (1985); Johnson, A
Shareholder Credit is the Correct Response to ·the, General
Utilities Problem , 30 Tax Notes 274 (Jan. 20., 1986),
39See · authorities cited in notes 37 and 38, supra . On a
theoretical basis a continued, corporate-Ievel exemption for
long-term capital assets merits serious consideration , basically.
to effectuate limitation of "double taxation'! to operating profits.
Id But given the realities that (1) virtually no corpora~e level tax
is currently actually levied on business operations (due to
ACRS, leverage, lTC, compensation to principals in closely held
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corporations, etc . } and (2) the cost-basis liquidation provisions
app'e ar most frequently utilized to transfer a business with a
single (~hareholder) level capital gain tax, (plus the recapture
income toll charge at the Target corporation level) the real world
issue is not double taxation, but rather whether there will be a
full tax at least one time. Compare Corporate Tax Reform
Proposals, supra at 17-18,49: Even if the closely held corporation is taxed on its earnings, the ridiculously low graduated
bottom corporate rates in comparison with the entrepreneur's
usually high bracket on any additional income couple'd with the
opportunity to invest the business' net profits after minimal or no
taxation in capital or section 1231 assets (e.g., plant and land)
erode most of the credibility to the frequently raised argument
that, absent the General Utilities exemptiqn for long-term capital
and section 1231 assets,the entrepreneur who incorporated her
or his farm or corrier drugstore would be worse off than if heor
she had operated asa sole proprietor or in a partnership . Why do
you think he or she incorporated in the first place? The Senate
Finance Staff said it well :
Although ·the .General Utilities doctrine, which exempts
corporate level gain f.rom tax ·on liquidation or ..current
distribution,is often thought Of as a relie(provisionJrom
the 'doubl.e tax system , in f.act .present law often teaves
taxpayers betteroH on balance, than they, would be if no
corporate level tax were imposed ,. Thus, if conkonte9bya
choice between the current system and a repealof·. the·
corporate level tax, such ti'lxpayers should choose current
. law. Senate Finance Staff Preliminary fleport, sup!aat88 ,
Sure enough, atleast their tax advisers so chose (apparently for
similar reasons} . See Sheppard, General' Uiilities Repeal: Of
Ostriches and Motherhood: 30. Tax Notes 691 (February 10.,
1986) . The tax advantages of the "inside" corporate ta'x s'hefter
(of low graduated rates) are widely proclaime'd in the tax
literature. See generally Watkins &: Jacobs,CloseTyHeld Businesses: Tax Planning afti:wERTA, .13 Tax Adviser 516 (1982);
Fink, Is There Still Life For Professional COff)Orations?; 9 Rev. of
Tax'n of Indiv's123, 128 (1985) ; Wood , Incorporation of Professionals Still Offers Benefits , 64 Taxes 38,41 (1986) . To the extent
the above pattern persists after this rou.nd of tax' reform, absolute
repealof General Utilities would closer approximate at least one·
full tax..
The Senate Finance Staff also argued that becaus'e rlorationale
exists for making entrepreneurs better off than they would be
under a tax system without a corporate " level tax, ' General
Utilitie~ ' shoulo be repealed . Senate Finance Staff, Preliminary
Report, siJpra at 88 Treasury I's single corporate tax rate two
percentage points below the topindividuar rate would have
ended the above abuse Given that this ' approachdoesnot
appe'a r to be politically feasible, my colleague Charles Koch
argues for repeal of the corp~rate tax ih general ! nofon the
classic ground that corporations don 't actually pay the double
tax '(i..e , they pass it on to consumers or shareholders), bLit
rather on the above observation tnat owners of close co'rporations at least must bebette'r off manipulating the conibinati6n of
corporate and personal income tax . The nontax advantages of
incorporation are dubiou's at best See generally Carlin, Partnership lis . Corporation; Non-Tax Shelter Business Enterprise, 34
NYU. Inst on Fed . Tax 741 (1977) ; Kessler & Yorio, Choosing
the Appropriate Form for the Small Business, 1 Corp. L. Rev .
291, 297 (1978) At least for the lower levels of corporate jncome,
a mandatory flow-through of income and loss to shareholders·
appears preferable to the current use of the closely held corporation asa tax shelter.
.
If the H.R. 3838 'shift of $150. billion in tax burden from individ-'
uals to coq:>6rations is effective, it will 'largely be to the public
corporations. They will pay an inside tax, The close corporation
can continue to use the 'inside low rate corporate shelter. Yetthe
continued General Utilities exemption will 'be avaiiable only to
the like,ly abuse candidates, the close corporation. " Princ'iple"
and politiCS here aren't even strange bedfellows; they sleep in different towns,
.0See Wolfman, s'u pra at 87;
supra at 682
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cr. Johnson, supra . But see Beck,

41 350. U . S. 46 (1955) .
"Cont'! Nat'l Bank V. Comm 'r , 69 T.C. 357, 374 (1977). acq . , .
1978-2 C .B 1.
'3" Corn Products has been extensively cited and applied , but
only a few ofthese subsequent cases involve repetitive, everyday
transactions like those that evoked the Corn Products doctrine."
2 Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, para.
51 ,10.3 (1981); accord, Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States ·
744 F.2d 442, 450. (5th Cir . 1984) . Other commentators note tti~
inventory-like aspects of the original decision: Note, The Impact
of Corn Products: Twenty- Three Years Later, 12 Suffolk U. L ·
Rev. 869, 874, 877 (1978)
"See W . W Windle Co. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 694, 712-713 (1976),
appeal dismissed, 550. F.2d 43 (1st Cir) , cert. denied, 431 U.S,
966 (1977) . See generally Comment, The Unpleasant Taste of
Corn Products , 53 So,. Cal. L. Rev. 311 (1979) ; LeMaster, Corporate Securities Losses.:' Is Corn Products Now Irrelevant?, 3 J.'
Corp. Tax . 141 (1976) . If, as this article advocates below, Corn ·
Products' application to sections 336-338 is limited to assets as.,
to which Target engages in repetitive, everyday transactions" ,.:
this issue of the proper standard for testing motivation for stock
acquisitions largely becomes moot since the reported cases .
have not involved repetitive acquisitions and dispositions of .
stock in order to obtain a source of supply, etc
.
45350. U.S at 50..
'6 Campbell Taggart, Inc . v. United States, supra at 456 and 457 .
n. 41 analyzing authorities cited thereat (rejecting thesis that
" necessary and integral act" is a separate element in the Corn
Products doctrine) .
47 551 F2d 821 , 826 (Ct CL 1977).
'BThe taxpayer in Norton may have been relying on the
traditional "liquidation of investment" avenue to capital gains,
viz. in liquidating or selling an investment, typically land, the
taxpayer may take reasonable steps to improve the property in
order to make it readily saleable, or even make multiple sales
from a block acquired in a single transaction without assuming
the mantle of dealer. See, e.g ., Ayling v . Comm'r, 32 T .C. 70.4,
70.9 (1959); accord, Chandlerv. United States , 226 F..2d 40.3 (7th
CiL 1955) . Some decisions would apply this doctrine to section
1231 assets as we" . See Fishing Tools, Inc v, Usry, 232 F. Supp.
40.0., 40.2 (E.D. La. 1964) . Properly viewed, any such avenue 'ls '
very narrow. See Biedenharn Realty Co . Ii. United States, 526
F.2d 40.9, 421-422 (5th Ci r.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) ; Cf.
Ehrman v. Comm 'r , 120. F..2d 60.7, 610. (9th CiL). cert.. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941) .
Some commentators would apply special rules to liquidating
sales of section 1231 assets pursuant to a complet~ liquidation
under section 337 . See Rabinovitz & Shashy, Properties of
Property: Indigestion From Corn Products, 27 U. Fla. L Rev. 964,
973, 981, 983, 984 (197Q); Compare Heyde, Transfers of Technology; The Appropriateness of Capital Gain Treatment, 64.
Taxes 3, 9 (1986) . Some cases also would bestow capital gains'
treatment upon a bulk sale of inventory or. property otherwi.se
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of.
business See Int'l Shoe Mach. Corp .. v. United States , 491 F:2d :
157,160. (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert.. denied, 419 US. 834 (1974)' A
perhaps analogous theory is the "end-of-the-cycle" rule purportedly explaining (section 1231) capital gains treatment af~ .
forded "the replacement of an obsolete factory, old rental cars,
or lost or damaged rental tools ." Hollywood Baseball Ass 'n ·v.
Comm 'r, 423 F..2d 494, 50.2 (9th Cir . 197Q) (dictum), see Int'I
Shoe Mach. Corp, v. United States, supra at 160. (dictum) . The
discussion in text assumes that the proper focus is not whether
the property is sold in bulk in a liquidation, but rather whether
the property is customarily sold by the taxpayer in the ordinary.
course of its business
49 551 F..2d at 827 n .18.
50314 F. Supp. 1273 (N D III. 1981) .
5'The "fire pot," " hotch pot" and five-year lookback recapture
of section 1231, and sections 1245-1250. depreciation recapture
are discussed in 2 Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income Estates
and Gifts, para . 54 ..1 (1981) These rules elimi nate mo;t capital
gain from section 1231 transactions. Cf. Rabinovitz & Shashy,
supra at 470. . H.R 3838 would eliminate preferential income tax
treatment of capital assets and section 1231 assets for corporate
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taxpayers by eliminating the current alternate maximum 28
percent rate, see H. R 3838, supra at section 302, while retaining
those categories of income or loss .. In effect this just increases
the stakes in revised section 336-338 t(ansactions for Target
corporation-level long-term capital gain income: recognition at
ordinary rates v. exemption
" See, e . g ., EI.. duPont deNemours & Co. v. United States, 288
F2d 904, 909 (Ct CL 1961); Fishing Tools, . Inc. v. Usry, 232 F.
Supp 400 (E. D. La 1964) .
53See Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc . v. United States, 279
F Supp. 661 , 668 (E. D. La. 1968).
.
" See, e.g., Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra at 973,979, 983-984;
Case Note, Liquidating Corporation Denied Nonrecognition
Benefits of Section 337 Because Sales of Depreciable Assets
Were Integral Part of Its Business, 24 Vand. L Rev . 181, 188
(1970) (sales , not assets, must be integral); Heyde, supra at 11
Indeed , one of the definitions of section 1245 property (subject to
•recapture of depreciation) consists of "property .. used as an
integral part of manufacturing, production, extraction . etc."
Section 1245(a)(3)(B) . Hence, an integral use in the business
reading of Corn Products would render this provision superfluous
and further " WOUld seem to indicate that all section .1231 assets
may be subject to the Corn Products doctrine . The question
would not seem to be merely whether such assets or transactions
were integral to the business but whether they were integral to
an ordinary income transaction and productive of planned and
continuing ordinary gain ." Discussion Draft: Capital AssetsMalat and Corn Products Problems, Chief Counsel's Conference,
Dearborn , Michigan, August 24 thru 28, 1970, Tax Court litigation Division Session lip .. 28 . Unfortunately, the only judicial
consideration of this argument is superficiaL See Int'l Shoe
Mach. Corp . v. United States, 369 F. Supp . 588; 593 (D. Mass
1973), a ff'd , 491 F2d 157 (1st Cir. 1974) .
" GraM Oil Tool Co . v. United States , 381 F.2d 389, 399(Ct CL
1967) ; Philadelphia Quartz Co . v. United States , 374 F.2d 512,
515 (Ct CL 1967) ; E.I. duPont deNemours & Go . v United States,
supra .
56 S~e Int'l Shoe Machine Corp.. v. United States, supra at 593.
" See , e .g., Cont'l Can Co . v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 414415 (Ct CI. 1970) .
58 383 U S. 569 (1966).

S9 Malat is authority for the si milar "p rimarily fo r sale" termi nolog y in section 1231 and present section 337 Seeliollywood
Baseball Ass 'n v. Comm 'r, 49 T.C . 338, 345 (1968), aff'd., 423 F 2d
494 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848(1970) See also
Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Comm 'r, '383 US, 824 (1966) . See '.
Note, Applicability of the Corn Products Doctrine .to Dispositions '
of Section 1231 Property Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation,
51 B.UL Rev. 120,123 n . 19, 128-129 (1971) .
60 See discussion in I Surre y, Warren , McDaniel & Ault, Federal
Income Ta xation 1013-15 (1972) .
6' See Bernstein, supra at 1107-09.
6'See id . at 1112
63 423 F.2d 494, 502 (9th Ci r), cert. denied, 400 U .S. 848 (1970) .
6' See Comment , Applicability of the Corn Products Doctrine
to Dispositions of Sec tion 1231 Property Pursuant to a Section
337 Liquidation , 51 B.U.. L Rev . 120, 1222 n.17 (1971) . Case
Note, Liquidating Corporation Denied Nonrecognition Benefits
of Section 337 Because Sales of Depreciable Assets were
Integral Part of Its Business , 24 Vand. L . Rev . 181 , 187 '{ 1970)
•5See Note 54, supra .
.657 T C. 15, 26 (1971) . See generally Parnell , Sale of Contracts;
When Capital Gains Treatment is Available to the Seller, 43 J .
Ta x . 200 (1975) .
. • 7Confusingly, the Ta x Court earlier had applied the Corn
Products doctrine to a termination of business sale of timber
cutting contracts, on the grounds that they had been acquired in
the ordinary course of the ta xpayer's business. JR. Simplot Co.
v. Comm'r, 26 TCM 488,492 (1967) .
68 46 TC . 599, 570 (1966) .
69 307 F.2d 897, 90 (5th Cir 1962) (" By no stretch Of the
imagination can the routine day~to-day sale of corn futures be
equated with an isolated sale of an agency contract " ) See also
Ofria v. Comm'r, 77 TC . 524, 545 (1981), appeal dismissed, (1st
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Cir. 1982) (sale of inventions by business of machining metal
parts was not an accepted and predictable part of such business,
but instead was isolated, nonrecurring and, hence, entitled to
capital gains) The Fifth Circuit historically has staked out the
position that a "single sale" of property held primarily for sale is
not a sale in the ordinary course of business. See note 35 supra .
70See Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, supra at451-52;
Arkansas Best Corp . v. Comm'r, 83 T C. 640, 656 (1984) . See
generally Javaras , Corporate Capital Gains and Losses- The
Corn Products Doctrine, 52 Taxes 770, 772 (1974) . The ramifications on the substitute for deductible business expense line of
cases of the origin-of-the-claim doctrine, see Lee & Murphy,
Capital Expenditures. A Result in Search ofa Rationale, 15. U.
Richmond L .. Rev . 473, 484-99, 523-24 (1981), and the cutback
on business purpose overrides as to capital expenditures (e . g . ,
the overturning of Five Star Mfg . Co. v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 724
(5th Cir 1966), by section 314 of HR . 3838, see HR Rep . No .
99-4265 , supra at 248-49) are yet to be fully manifested .
" Some commentators would interpret "integral" as meaning
the sales, rather than the use of the asset, need be integral to the
taxpayer's mainstream business forthe Corn Products doctrine
to apply . See Case Note, 24 Vand . L Rev. supra at 188-189;
Heyde, supra at 11 This would usually be the case. if sales were
recurring (except, perhaps, under the former Court of Claims
approach, see note 55, supra and accompanying text), but such
an approach could easily turn into a substitute for ordinary deduction (see note 70 supra) .

" See , e.g . , Javaras, supra; Rabinovitz & . Shashy, supra . Although beyond the scope of this article, more of the reported
decisions involving otherwise capital or section 1231 assets not
held primarily for sale probably could be reconciled under a
model focusing on the source of the income or loss, ratherthan
on the importance or the ta xpayer's motives . Gain arising from
market appreciation would be ' capital unless the taxpayer ' recurringly engaged in the transactions, in which case the ordinary
so'urce of business income principle wouid override. Conversely,
losses arising from business use would be ordinary .. Of course,
precisely this capital gain / ordinary loss result bothered the Tax
Court so in W. W. Windle Co. v. Comm'r, supra , and probably
disturbs other tribunals as well . See Wright v. Comm 'r , 756 F..2d
1039 (4th Cir. 1985) .
73Si mplification denotes to practitioners attainment of a reasonabl y certain conc lusion by diligent and exper't research
wi t hout expend it ure of excessive research time . Committe ~ .on
Ta x Policy, New York State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section , A Report on
Complexity and the Incorn.fJ . Tax, 27 Tax L . Rev . 325, 327 (1972) .
" See United Sta tes v. Mo rss, 159 F.2d i42 , 142~143 (lsf Cir
1947) (" In .. .. [the] process of case-law development,. courts are
api by insensi ble degrees to .be led to conclusions incompatible
with the statutory framework .. The corrective of this . . . is to get
back to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code itself, to see
wheth er a proposed conc lusion . . comports with the statut ory
sch eme. .. ). Anderson v. United States, 468 F. Supp . 1085, 1100
(0 Minn . 1979), aft'd, 624 F.2d 1109.(8th Cir 1980) , appears an
example of this principle; extending Windle to nonstock circumstances, notwithstanding the clear reluctance of ' the Windle
court itself to take that step
75 345 F.2d 35, 44-45 (4th Gir. 1965); accord, Coast Oil Co . v.
Comm 'r , 50 TC . 528, 535 (1968), aft'd, 442 F.2d 402 (9th Cir .
1970) (per curiam) .
76Cogen t criticisms of this thesis are contained in MidlandRoss Corp . v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 116 (6th Cir . 1973) .
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit later pointed out that (a) the defink
tions in existing sections 337(b) and 1221 are not identical , and
(b) the "income generated by normal operations of a business
passage" in the legislative history relied upon by Pridemark
related to history discussing th e present law " bulk sales " exception relating to inventory contained in existing section 337(b)(2) .
Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v.. Comm :r, 423 F .2d at 449-500;
accord, Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, supra at 1.16.
77 Midland-Ross ,Corp .. v. United States, supra at 118; accord,
Peterson v United States, 723 F 2d 43 (8th Cir . 1983) (per
curiam); Storz v. Comm 'r, 583 F.2d 972, 975 (8th Ci r . 1978) ;
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Stewart Trust v. Comm'r, 63 T.C, 982 (1975); Rev, Rul. 77-190,
1977~,1 CE!, 88,
, '
"
'6Th e " pari ty " issue prior to TEFRA arose most frequently in
the co ntrast between Target corporation level treatment in
Target stock and Target asset sales, See generally Bonovitz,
Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment Under Sections
337 and 334(b)(2), 34 N,y',U, Inst. on Fed , Tax. 57,60-75 (1976)
Target asset sales pursuant to a complete liquidation under section 331 triggered section 337 if its timing requirements were
met Prior to section 338 (enacted in 1982), the acquiring or
"purchasing corporation" could obtain a "cost-basis" in Targers
assets following a timely qualified purchase of "control " of
Target's stock only by "timely" liquidating Target under section
332, thereby triggering the cost-basis adjustments of now 'repealed section 334(b)(2) . The liquidati 9n of Target triggered
application of section 336 at the Target level and, thus, the issue
of parity between stock and asset sales. The goal of parity here
has come ever closer with the enactment and successive amendments of existing section 338, although total parity has not yet
been reached , .see Ginsburg , 38 Tax L Rev, supra at 253-256,
289, 295-297 (1983) ; Ferguson & Stiver, supra , at 12-35-12-39,
'12-48-12-56. Neither, unfortunately, would H R., 3838 reach perfect pari ty, see, e"g , proposed section 337(b)(3)(A) ,
79
423 F.2d at 498,
6°ld, at 500.
. lld."
·'Stewart Trust v, Comm 'r, supra at 692 n.4.
63See , e,g " W. w.. .wi,ndle Co, v; Comm'r, ,s up(a at 710-71.1
(whether proper test in ' mixed bus,iness-inv~stment context i ~,,(a)
" predominant" business motivation or investment motivatiori or
(b) Qusiness motivation with no substantial investment motivac ,
t,ion "has seemingly so troubled the C00rt of Claims" ); accord"
Miller v, Comm 'r , 70 T ,e , 448,455 n,7 (1978) , The actual confli <;t
between th e judges then on the Court of Claims appears to have
centered more on the "permanency'.' doctrine, In Dearborn, Co.
v, United States , .444 F.,2d1145, 114iq9t CI. Hi71) , UieCourtpf '
Claims, foun,d Corn Prod,uct{> inapplicable to a sale ~t a loss o~
corporate stock where the ta xpayer-parent corporation manifested a substantial investment intent (to continue permanently
the subsidiary's qusiness, to receive dividends, to earnmanagec
ment fees from services provided to the subsidiary, and to share
in capital appreciation) , even though the parent had bysiness
reasons (source of supply and production facilities) which were
mor,e important. 444 F.2d 1148 and 1166, Agway, Inc" v, Uriited '
States : 524 F,2d 1194, 1261 (c;t CL 1975) , in a three-judge panElI
(agreeing on this point) opinion; confirmed that. Corn Product!?
applied to a purchase of corporate stock 'to obtain sou rce of '
supply only where there is no subs'tantial investrnenhnl entBut
inUnicfn Pac. R,A. v, United States , 524F..2d 1343'(Ct CL 1975) ;
decided the same day as' Agway , the majority of the en banc
Court of Claims 'read the traditional so'urce 'of supply stock ac~ ,
quisition cases (without Citing Dearborn ) for'the rule that

a

CI. 1969) (Nicholls, J , dissenting ), And , conversely under this
view, a permanent addition of a subsid iary to a corporation's
capital wouldnot enjoy Corn Products ' ordinary loss statUs"
Union Pac" A.A. Ii, United States, supra at 1387, 1388 (Nicholls;
J" dissenting) ; Waterman, Largen & Co, v" United States, supra '
at 855 (Davis, J", dissenting) (" I note , in addition , that I am riot
yet convinced that the standard of investment or busines~
purpose is appropriate for this type of case in which a permanent
,
'
acquisition of stock is made ", " ),
At the other extreme, the Fifth Circuit in Schlumberger Tech.
Corp, v. United States , 443 F,2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir, 1971) ,
rejected a" temporary business expedient" requirement " Instead
it viewed such " rule" as
merely a factual element that, under appropriate circumstances, justifies a taxpayer's acquisition of what would
otherwise be a capital asset, and , in turn , requires the
acquiring taxpayer, if he desires to avoid capital asset
treament of the acquisition , to dispose of the asset once
the temporary condition being remedied has terminated
and t he nature of the asset has changed from business
purpose to investment purpose, Id"
The Fifth Circuit in Campbell Taggart, supra at 457, similarl,y
vi ewed the "necessary and integral act" test , which it believe,d ,
many courts apparently considered synonymous with business
purpose , as merely the previously rejected as controlling "degree
of business needed," phrased 'slightly differently and hence.only
a factor in determining intent.
,
6' See Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra at 981 (but would not app,l y.
to doctrine to a bulk sale of Target's assets) ; Note, Applicability
of the Corn Products Doctrine, to Dispositions of Section 123.1
Property Pursuant to a Section 337 LiquidatiOn , 51 B U" L Rev:
120, 131 (1971) .
"
.
".
65 Case Note, Section 337 Nonrecognition Denied to Corn,,' :
Produc ts Income, 42 Tulane L Rev 423, 425-428 (1971)
"~ ' ,,
66See Note 54 supra , The government's litigating stance in.:.
Norton indicates this is not the case. Even if it were, taxpayers
might still raise these arguments· where to their advantag~ as
witnessed by Becker Warburg Paribas ,
6' See W. W. Windle Co. v, Comm 'r, supra at 713.
.6 For instance, even after Windle had clearly articulated t,h.e
" Heads-I-win , Tails-you-Iose" features of the Com Products
doctrine and at the same time that the Justice Departmen f
clea rly hoped to limit the doctrin e to inventory-like situations (
and esc hew motive analysis , see Brief for Appellee at 44-48, 52,'
W. W Windle Co. v, Comm 'r, 550 F.2d 43 (1st CiL), dismissirig .
appeal, cert denied, 431 U,S. 966 (1977), the Service nevertheless,
short-sightedly attempted in Bell Fibre Prod's Corp. v. Comm 'r, '
36 CCH T. C.M . 182, 190 (1977). appeal dismissed F.2d (7th Cir.
1977), to repudiate Windle , appare ntly because the taxpaye(at
bar had realized a gain , rather than a loss
69 See note 78 supra for prior'iaw,

corporate stock which is held for business purposes; that
is, one intimately related to the taxpayer's normal source
of business income, is not a capital asset. Stock 'not so,
related , and held for investment purposes, is a capital
asset. 524 F,2d at 1358,
On the facts before it, the Union Pac" majority found that th e
taxpayer had acquired tlie stockdf subsidiary -rallroad compari'ies
(previously owned by it but sold in a distress worko'ut) foran '
operating business purpose (to obl-ain conriecting ' railroads and
run as a unified business) and not to make im investment' 524 '
F,2d at 1359.
"
'
The author of the Agway opinion (Judge Nicholls) dissented
on this point, reasoning that the subsidiaries were intended to be
a permanent addition to the taxpayer's assets" 524 F'. 2d 1388,
Indeed, he would virtually restdct Corn Products as to corporate
stock to a "temporary expediency" where the stock is acquired
"as an expedient to tide the buyer over a period of' shortage and ,
high prices of some material vitally needed ihits business [and
with] an intention to dispose of the acquisitioniNhen the shortage
ended, which was carried out with reasonable promptness:"
Waterman, Largen & Co, v" United States , 419 F 2d 845, 859 (.Ct

1386
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